The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1991/91_1030/91_1030.zx

Text File | 1993-04-21 | 33.8 KB | 644 lines

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 91-1030
--------
PAMELA WITHROW, PETITIONER v. ROBERT
ALLEN WILLIAMS, Jr.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the sixth circuit
[April 21, 1993]

  Justice O'Connor, with whom The Chief Justice
joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
  Today the Court permits the federal courts to overturn
on habeas the conviction of a double-murderer, not on the
basis of an inexorable constitutional or statutory com-
mand, but because it believes the result desirable from
the standpoint of equity and judicial administration.
Because the principles that inform our habeas jurispru-
dence-finality, federalism, and fairness-counsel decisively
against the result the Court reaches, I respectfully dissent
from this holding.
                            I
  The Court does not sit today in direct review of a state-
court judgment of conviction.  Rather, respondent seeks
relief by collaterally attacking his conviction through the
writ of habeas corpus.  While petitions for the writ of
habeas corpus are now commonplace-over 12,000 were
filed in 1990, compared to 127 in 1941-their current
ubiquity ought not detract from the writ's historic impor-
tance.  See L. Mecham, Annual Report of the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 191
(1991) (1990 figures); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 446, n.
2 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (1941 figures).  -The Great
Writ- can be traced through the common law to well

before the founding of this Nation; its role as a -prompt
and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be
intolerable restraints- is beyond question.  Fay, 372 U. S.,
at 401-402.  As Justice Harlan explained:
      -Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is today, as it has
always been, a fundamental safeguard against
unlawful custody. . . . Although the wording of earlier
statutory provisions has been changed, the basic
question before the court to which the writ is
addressed has always been the same: in the language
of the present statute, on the books since 1867, is the
detention complained of `in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States'?-
Id., at 449 (dissenting).
  Nonetheless, we repeatedly have recognized that colla-
teral attacks raise numerous concerns not present on
direct review.  Most profound is the effect on finality.  It
goes without saying that, at some point, judicial pro-
ceedings must draw to a close and the matter deemed
conclusively resolved; no society can afford forever to
question the correctness of its every judgment.  -[T]he
writ,- however, -strikes at finality,- McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at 22), depriving the
criminal law -of much of its deterrent effect,- Teague v.
Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 309 (1989) (plurality opinion), and
sometimes preventing the law's just application altogether.
See McCleskey, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 22).  -No one,
not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not
society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing
a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and
every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be
subject to fresh litigation.-  Mackey v. United States, 401
U. S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also McCleskey, supra, at ___ (slip
op., at 23).
  In our federal system, state courts have primary respon-
sibility for enforcing constitutional rules in their own
criminal trials.  When a case comes before the federal
courts on habeas rather than on direct review, the judicial
role is -significantly different.-  Mackey, supra, at 682
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Accord, Teague, supra, at 306-308.  Most important here,
federal courts on direct review adjudicate every issue of
federal law properly presented; in contrast, -federal courts
have never had a similar obligation on habeas corpus.-
Mackey, supra, at 682 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).  As the Court explains today, federal
courts exercising their habeas powers may refuse to grant
relief on certain claims because of -prudential concerns-
such as equity and federalism.  Ante, at 4.  This follows
not only from the express language of the habeas statute,
which directs the federal courts to -dispose of [habeas
petitions] as law and justice require,- 28  U. S. C. 2243,
but from our precedents as well.  In Francis v. Henderson,
425 U. S. 536 (1976), we stated that -[t]his Court has long
recognized that in some circumstances considerations of
comity and concerns for the orderly administration of
criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the
exercise of its habeas corpus power.-  Id., at 539.  Accord,
Gomez v. United States District Court for Northern Dist.
of California, 503 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 1)
(-Whether [a] claim is framed as a habeas petition or
1983 action, [what is sought is] an equitable remedy;- as
a result, equity must be -take[n] into consideration-); Fay
v. Noia, supra, at 438 (-[H]abeas corpus has traditionally
been regarded as governed by equitable principles-);
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 213 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (-[T]he Court has long recog-
nized that habeas corpus [is] governed by equitable prin-
ciples- (internal quotation marks omitted)).
  Concerns for equity and federalism resonate throughout
our habeas jurisprudence.  In 1886, only eight years after
Congress gave the federal courts power to issue writs
ordering the release of state prisoners, this Court
explained that courts could accommodate federalism and
comity concerns by withholding relief until after state
proceedings had terminated.  Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S.
241, 251-253 (1886).  Accord, Fay, supra, at 418-419.
More recently, we relied on those same concerns in
holding that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure
do not apply retroactively on habeas.  Teague, supra, at
306.  Our treatment of successive petitions and
procedurally defaulted claims similarly is governed by
equitable principles.  McCleskey, 499 U. S., at ___
(successive petitions) (slip op., at 20-22); id., at ___
(procedurally defaulted claims) (slip op., at 21); Fay,
supra, at 438 (procedurally defaulted claims).  Most telling
of all, this Court continuously has recognized that the
ultimate equity on the prisoner's side-a sufficient
showing of actual innocence-is normally sufficient,
standing alone, to outweigh other concerns and justify
adjudication of the prisoner's constitutional claim.  See
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. ___, ___-___ (1992) (actual
innocence of penalty) (slip op., at 6-13); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 496 (1986) (federal courts may
reach procedurally defaulted claims on a showing that a
constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction
of an actually innocent person); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477
U. S. 436, 454 (1986) (colorable showing of actual
innocence suffices to excuse successive claim); see also
Teague v. Lane, supra, at 313 (where absence of procedure
seriously diminishes the likelihood of an accurate convic-
tion, a new rule requiring the procedure may be applied
retroactively on habeas).
  Nonetheless, decisions concerning the availability of
habeas relief warrant restraint.  Nowhere is the Court's
restraint more evident than when it is asked to exclude
a substantive category of issues from relitigation on
habeas.  Although we recognized the possibility of
excluding certain types of claims long ago, see Mackey,
401 U. S., at 683 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), only once has this Court found that
the concerns of finality, federalism, and fairness supported
such a result; that was in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465
(1976).  Ante, at 4-5.  Since then, the Court has refused
to bar additional categories of claims on three different
occasions.  Ante, at 5-7.
  Today we face the question whether alleged violations
of the prophylactic rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.
436 (1966), should be cognizable on habeas.  Continuing
the tradition of caution in this area, the Court answers
that question in the negative.  This time I must disagree.
In my view, the -prudential concerns,- ante, at 4, that
inform our habeas jurisprudence counsel the exclusion of
Miranda claims just as strongly as they did the
exclusionary rule claims at issue in Stone itself.

                           II
  In Stone, the Court explained that the exclusionary rule
of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), was not an
inevitable product of the Constitution but instead -`a
judicially created remedy.'-  Stone, supra, at 486 (quoting
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 349 (1974)).  By
threatening to exclude highly probative and sometimes
critical evidence, the exclusionary rule -is thought to
encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies,
and the officers who implement them, to incorporate
Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system.-  Stone,
428 U. S., at 492.  The deterrent effect is strong: Any
transgression of the Fourth Amendment carries the risk
that evidence will be excluded at trial.  Nonetheless, this
increased sensitivity to Fourth Amendment values carries
a high cost.  Exclusion not only deprives the jury of
probative and sometimes dispositive evidence, but it also
-deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the
guilty.-  Id., at 490.  When that happens, it is not just
the executive or the judiciary but all of society that
suffers: The executive suffers because the police lose their
suspect and the prosecutor the case; the judiciary suffers
because its processes are diverted from the central mission
of ascertaining the truth; and society suffers because the
populace again finds a guilty and potentially dangerous
person in its midst, solely because a police officer bungled.
  While that cost is considered acceptable when a case is
on direct review, the balance shifts decisively once the
case is on habeas.  There is little marginal benefit to
enforcing the exclusionary rule on habeas; the penalty of
exclusion comes too late to produce a noticeable deterrent
effect.  Id., at 493.  Moreover, the rule -divert[s attention]
from the ultimate question of guilt,- squanders scarce
federal judicial resources, intrudes on the interest in
finality, creates friction between the state and federal
systems of justice, and upsets the -`constitutional balance
upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded.'-  Id.,
at 490, 491, n. 31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U. S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).  Because
application of the exclusionary rule on habeas -offend[s]
important principles of federalism and finality in the
criminal law which have long informed the federal courts'
exercise of habeas jurisdiction,- Duckworth, 492 U. S., at
208 (O'Connor, J., concurring), we held in Stone that
such claims would no longer be cognizable on habeas so
long as the State already had provided the defendant with
a full and fair opportunity to litigate.
  I continue to believe that these same considerations
apply to Miranda claims with equal if not greater force.
See Duckworth, supra, at 209 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Like the suppression of the fruits of an illegal search or
seizure, the exclusion of statements obtained in violation
of Miranda is not constitutionally required.  This Court
repeatedly has held that Miranda's warning requirement
is not a dictate of the Fifth Amendment itself, but a
prophylactic rule.  See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at 4); Michigan v. Harvey,
494 U. S. 344, 350 (1990); Duckworth, supra, at 203; New
York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 442-446 (1974).  Because Miranda
-sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself,-
it excludes some confessions even though the Constitution
would not.  Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 306 (1985).
Indeed, -in the individual case, Miranda's preventive
medicine [often] provides a remedy even to the defendant
who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.-  Id.,
at 307.
  Miranda's overbreadth, of course, is not without justi-
fication.  The exclusion of unwarned statements provides
a strong incentive for the police to adopt -procedural
safeguards,- Miranda, 384 U. S., at 444, against the
exaction of compelled or involuntary statements.  It also
promotes institutional respect for constitutional values.
But, like the exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence,
Miranda's prophylactic rule does so at a substantial cost.
Unlike involuntary or compelled statements-which are of
dubious reliability and are therefore inadmissible for any
purpose-confessions obtained in violation of Miranda are
not necessarily untrustworthy.  In fact, because voluntary
statements are -trustworthy- even when obtained without
proper warnings, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719,
731 (1966), their suppression actually impairs the pursuit
of truth by concealing probative information from the trier
of fact.  See Harvey, supra, at 350 (Miranda -result[s] in
the exclusion of some voluntary and reliable statements-);
Elstad, supra, at 312 (loss of -highly probative evidence
of a voluntary confession- is a -high cost [for] law enforce-
ment-); McNeil, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 9) (Because -the
ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil
but an unmitigated good,- the exclusion of such
confessions renders society -the loser-); Tucker, supra, at
461 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (-[H]aving rele-
vant and probative testimony, not obtained by actual
coercion . . . aid[s] in the pursuit of truth-); Miranda,
supra, at 538 (White, J., dissenting) (-Particularly when
corroborated, . . . such [voluntary] confessions have the
highest reliability and significantly contribute to the
certitude with which we may believe the accused is
guilty-).
  When the case is on direct review, that damage to the
truth-seeking function is deemed an acceptable sacrifice
for the deterrence and respect for constitutional values
that the Miranda rule brings.  But once a case is on
collateral review, the balance between the costs and bene-
fits shifts; the interests of federalism, finality, and fairness
compel Miranda's exclusion from habeas.  The benefit of
enforcing Miranda through habeas is marginal at best.
To the extent Miranda ensures the exclusion of involun-
tary statements, that task can be performed more
accurately by adjudicating the voluntariness question
directly.  See Johnson, supra, at 730-731.  And, to the
extent exclusion of voluntary but unwarned confessions
serves a deterrent function, -[t]he awarding of habeas
relief years after conviction will often strike like lightning,
and it is absurd to think that this added possibility . . .
will have any appreciable effect on police training or
behavior.-  Duckworth, supra, at 211 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).  Judge Friendly made precisely the same
point 18 years earlier: -[T]he deterrent value of permitting
collateral attack,- he explained, -goes beyond the point of
diminishing returns.-  Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 142, 163 (1970).
  Despite its meager benefits, the relitigation of Miranda
claims on habeas imposes substantial costs.  Just like the
application of the exclusionary rule, application of
Miranda's prophylactic rule on habeas consumes scarce
judicial resources on an issue unrelated to guilt or
innocence.  No less than the exclusionary rule, it
undercuts finality.  It creates tension between the state
and federal courts.  And it upsets the division of respon-
sibilities that underlies our federal system.  But most
troubling of all, Miranda's application on habeas some-
times precludes the just application of law altogether.
The order excluding the statement will often be issued
-years after trial, when a new trial may be a practical
impossibility.-  Duckworth, 492 U. S., at 211 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).  Whether the Court admits it or not, the
grim result of applying Miranda on habeas will be, time
and time again, -the release of an admittedly guilty
individual who may pose a continuing threat to society.-
Ibid.
  Any rule that so demonstrably renders truth and society
-the loser,- McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 9), -`bear[s] a heavy burden of justification, and
must be carefully limited to the circumstances in which
it will pay its way by deterring official lawlessness.'-
United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 908, n. 6 (1984)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 257-258 (1983)
(White, J., concurring in judgment)).  That burden is
heavier still on collateral review.  In light of the meager
deterrent benefit it brings and the tremendous costs it
imposes, in my view application of Miranda's prophylactic
rule on habeas -falls short- of justification.  Ante, at 7.

                           III
  The Court identifies a number of differences that, in its
view, distinguish this case from Stone v. Powell.  Ante, at
10-14.  I am sympathetic to the Court's concerns but find
them misplaced nonetheless.
  The first difference the Court identifies concerns the
nature of the right protected.  Miranda, the Court cor-
rectly points out, fosters Fifth Amendment rather than
Fourth Amendment values.  Ante, at 10.  The Court then
offers a defense of the Fifth Amendment, reminding us
that it is -`a fundamental trial right'- that reflects
-`principles of humanity and civil liberty'-; that it was
secured -`after years of struggle'-; and that it does not
serve -some value necessarily divorced from the correct
ascertainment of guilt.-  Ante, at 10-11 (quoting United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 364 (1990), and
Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 544 (1897)).  The
Court's spirited defense of the Fifth Amendment is, of
course, entirely beside the point.  The question is not
whether true Fifth Amendment claims-the extraction and
use of compelled testimony-should be cognizable on
habeas.  It is whether violations of Miranda's prophylactic
rule, which excludes from trial voluntary confessions
obtained without the benefit of Miranda's now-familiar
warnings, should be.  The questions are not the same; nor
are their answers.
  To say that the Fifth Amendment is a -`fundamental
trial right,'- ante, at 10 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 264 (1990)), is thus both correct
and irrelevant.  Miranda's warning requirement may bear
many labels, but -fundamental trial right- is not among
them.  Long before Miranda was decided, it was well
established that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the
introduction of compelled or involuntary confessions at
trial.  And long before Miranda, the courts enforced that
prohibition by asking a simple and direct question: Was
-the confession the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice,- or was the defendant's will -over-
borne-?  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S., at 225
(quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 602
(1961)); see, e.g., Bram v. United States, supra; ante, at
7.  Miranda's innovation was its introduction of the
warning requirement: It commanded the police to issue
warnings (or establish other procedural safeguards) before
obtaining a statement through custodial interrogation.
And it backed that prophylactic rule with a similarly
prophylactic remedy-the requirement that unwarned
custodial statements, even if wholly voluntary, be excluded
at trial.  Miranda, 384 U. S., at 444.  Excluding violations
of Miranda's prophylactic suppression requirement from
habeas would not leave true Fifth Amendment violations
unredressed.  Prisoners still would be able to seek relief
by -invok[ing] a substantive test of voluntariness- or
demonstrating prohibited coercion directly.  Johnson, 384
U. S., at 730; Elstad, 470 U. S., at 307-308 (statements
falling outside Miranda's sweep analyzed under
voluntariness standard).  The Court concedes as much.
Ante, at 11-12 (-[E]liminating habeas review of Miranda
issues would not prevent a state prisoner from simply
converting his barred Miranda claim into a due process
claim that his conviction rested on an involuntary
confession-).
  Excluding Miranda claims from habeas, then, denies
collateral relief only in those cases in which the prisoner's
statement was neither compelled nor involuntary but
merely obtained without the benefit of Miranda's prophy-
lactic warnings.  The availability of a suppression remedy
in such cases cannot be labeled a -fundamental trial
right,- for there is no constitutional right to the
suppression of voluntary statements.  Quite the opposite:
The Fifth Amendment, by its terms, prohibits only
compelled self-incrimination; it makes no mention of
-unwarned- statements.  U. S. Const., Amdt. 5 (-No
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself- (emphasis added)).  On that
much, our cases could not be clearer.  See, e.g., Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U. S., at 448 (-Cases which involve the
Self-Incrimination Clause must, by definition, involve an
element of coercion, since the Clause provides only that
a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself-); see Elstad, supra, at 306-307; New York v.
Quarles, 467 U. S., at 654-655, and n. 5.  As a result, the
failure to issue warnings does -not abridge [the] consti-
tutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
but depart[s] only from the prophylactic standards later
laid down by this Court in Miranda.-  Tucker, supra, at
446.  If the principles of federalism, finality, and fairness
ever counsel in favor of withholding relief on habeas,
surely they do so where there is no constitutional harm
to remedy.
  Similarly unpersuasive is the Court's related argument,
ante, at 11, that the Fifth Amendment trial right is not
-necessarily divorced- from the interest of reliability.
Whatever the Fifth Amendment's relationship to reliabil-
ity, Miranda's prophylactic rule is not merely -divorced-
from the quest for truth but at war with it as well.  The
absence of Miranda warnings does not by some mysterious
alchemy convert a voluntary and trustworthy statement
into an involuntary and unreliable one.  To suggest
otherwise is both unrealistic and contrary to precedent.
As I explained above, we have held over and over again
that the exclusion of unwarned but voluntary statements
not only fails to advance the cause of accuracy but
impedes it by depriving the jury of trustworthy evidence.
Supra, at 7-8.  In fact, we have determined that the
damage Miranda does to the truth-seeking mission of the
criminal trial can become intolerable.  We therefore have
limited the extent of the suppression remedy, see Harris
v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 224-226 (1971) (unwarned
but voluntary statement may be used for impeachment),
and dispensed with it entirely elsewhere, see Quarles,
supra (unwarned statement may be used for any purpose
where statement was obtained under exigent circum-
stances bearing on public safety).  And at least one
member of this Court dissented from Miranda itself
because it -establish[ed] a new . . . barrier to the
ascertainment of truth by the judicial process.-  Miranda,
supra, at 542 (White, J., dissenting).  Consequently, I
agree with the Court that Miranda's relationship to
accurate verdicts is an important consideration when
deciding whether to permit Miranda claims on habeas.
But it is a consideration that weighs decisively against the
Court's decision today.
  The consideration the Court identifies as being -most
importan[t]- of all, ante, at 11, is an entirely pragmatic
one.  Specifically, the Court -project[s]- that excluding
Miranda questions from habeas will not significantly
promote efficiency or federalism because some Miranda
issues are relevant to a statement's voluntariness.  Ante,
at 11-14.  It is true that barring Miranda claims from
habeas poses no barrier to the adjudication of voluntari-
ness questions.  But that does not make it -reasonable to
suppose that virtually all Miranda claims [will] simply be
recast- and litigated as voluntariness claims.  Ante, at 12.
Involuntariness requires coercive state action, such as
trickery, psychological pressure, or mistreatment.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U. S. 157, 167 (1986) (-[C]oer-
cive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not `voluntary'-); ante, at 12 (referring
to -the crucial element of police coercion-).  A Miranda
claim, by contrast, requires no evidence of police over-
reaching whatsoever; it is enough that law enforcement
officers commit a technical error.  Even the forgetful
failure to issue warnings to the most wary, knowledgeable,
and seasoned of criminals will do.  Miranda, 384 U. S.,
at 468 (-[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual cases
whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a
warning being given-).  Given the Court's unqualified trust
in the willingness of police officers to satisfy Miranda's
requirements, ante, at 13, its suggestion that their every
failure to do so involves coercion seems to me ironic.  If
the police have truly grown in -constitutional . . . sophisti-
cation,- ante, at 13, then certainly it is reasonable to
suppose that most technical errors in the administration
of Miranda's warnings are just that.
  In any event, I see no need to resort to supposition.
The published decisions of the lower federal courts show
that what the Court assumes to be true demonstrably is
not.  In case after case, the courts are asked on habeas
to decide purely technical Miranda questions that contain
not even a hint of police overreaching.  And in case after
case, no voluntariness issue is raised, primarily because
none exists.  Whether the suspect was in -custody,- whe-
ther or not there was -interrogation,- whether warnings
were given or were adequate, whether the defendant's
equivocal statement constituted an invocation of rights,
whether waiver was knowing and intelligent-this is the
stuff that Miranda claims are made of.  While these
questions create litigable issues under Miranda, they
generally do not indicate the existence of coercion
-pressure tactics, deprivations, or exploitations of the
defendant's weaknesses-sufficient to establish involun-
tariness.
  Even assuming that many Miranda claims could -simply
be recast- as voluntariness claims, it does not follow that
barring Miranda's prophylactic rule from habeas would
unduly complicate their resolution.  The Court labels
Miranda a -bright-line (or, at least, brighter-line)
rul[e]- and involuntariness an -exhaustive totality-of-
circumstances approach,- ante, at 12, but surely those
labels overstate the differences.  Miranda, for all its
alleged brightness, is not without its difficulties; and
voluntariness is not without its strengths.  Justice White
so observed in his Miranda dissent, noting that the Court
could not claim that
-judicial time and effort . . . will be conserved because
of the ease of application of the [Miranda] rule.
[Miranda] leaves open such questions as whether the
accused was in custody, whether his statements were
spontaneous or the product of interrogation, whether
the accused has effectively waived his rights, . . . all
of which are certain to prove productive of uncertainty
during investigation and litigation during prosecution.-
Miranda, 384 U. S., at 544-545.
Experience has proved Justice White's prediction correct.
Miranda creates as many close questions as it resolves.
The task of determining whether a defendant is in -cus-
tody- has proved to be -a slippery one.-  Elstad, 470
U. S., at 309; see, e.g., supra, at 14, n. 1 (custody cases).
And the supposedly -bright- lines that separate interro-
gation from spontaneous declaration, the exercise of a
right from waiver, and the adequate warning from the
inadequate, likewise have turned out to be rather dim and
ill-defined.  See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291
(1980) (interrogation); n. 2, supra (interrogation); nn. 4
and 5, supra (waiver and invocation); n. 3, supra
(adequacy of warnings).  Yet Miranda requires those lines
to be drawn with precision in each case.
  The totality-of-the-circumstances approach, on the other
hand, permits each fact to be taken into account without
resort to formal and dispositive labels.  By dispensing
with the difficulty of producing a yes-or-no answer to
questions that are often better answered in shades and
degrees, the voluntariness inquiry often can make judicial
decisionmaking easier rather than more onerous.  Thus,
it is true that the existence of warnings is still a
consideration under the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, ante, at 12, but it is unnecessary to determine
conclusively whether -custody- existed and triggered the
warning requirement, or whether the warnings given were
sufficient.  It is enough that the habeas court look to the
warnings or their absence, along with all other factors,
and consider them in deciding what is, after all, the
ultimate question: whether the confession was compelled
and involuntary or the product of a free and unimpaired
will.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S., at
225-226.
  Nor does continued application of Miranda's prophylactic
rule on habeas dispense with the necessity of testing
confessions for voluntariness.  While Miranda's conclusive
presumption of coercion may sound like an impenetrable
barrier to the introduction of compelled testimony, in
practice it leaks like a sieve.  Miranda, for example, does
not preclude the use of an unwarned confession outside
the prosecution's case in chief, Harris v. New York, 401
U. S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975);
involuntary statements, by contrast, must be excluded
from trial for all purposes, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S.
385, 398 (1978).  Miranda does not preclude admission of
the fruits of an unwarned statement, see Oregon v.
Elstad, supra; but under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, we require the suppression of not only
compelled confessions but tainted subsequent confessions
as well, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U. S. 707, 710 (1967).
Finally, Miranda can fail to exclude some truly
involuntary statements: It is entirely possible to extract
a compelled statement despite the most precise and
accurate of warnings.  See Johnson, 384 U. S., at 730
(warnings are only one factor in determining voluntari-
ness).
  The Court's final rationale is that, because the federal
courts rarely issue writs for Miranda violations, elimi-
nating Miranda claims from habeas will not decrease
state-federal tensions to an appreciable degree.  Ante, at
13-14.  The relative infrequency of relief, however, does
not diminish the intrusion on state sovereignty; it
diminishes only our justification for intruding in the first
place.  After all, even if relief is denied at the end of the
day, the State still must divert its scarce prosecutorial
resources to defend an otherwise final conviction.  If relief
is truly rare, efficiency counsels in favor of dispensing
with the search for the prophylactic rule violation in a
haystack; instead, the federal courts should concentrate
on the search for true Fifth Amendment violations by
adjudicating the questions of voluntariness and compulsion
directly.  I therefore find it of little moment that the
Police Foundation, et al., support respondent.  Ante, at 14,
n. 6.  Those who bear the primary burden of defending
state convictions in federal courts-including 36 States
and the National District Attorneys Association-
resoundingly support the opposite side.  See Brief for
California et al. as Amici Curiae; Brief for Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., and the National District
Attorneys Association, Inc., as Amici Curiae; see also Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae (United States must
defend against claims raised by federal prisoners under
28 U. S. C. 2255).
  The Court's response, that perhaps the police respect
the Miranda rule as a result of -the existence of [habeas]
review,- ante, at 14, is contrary to both case law and
common sense.  As explained above, there is simply no
reason to think that habeas relief, which often -`strike[s]
like lightning'- years after conviction, contributes much
additional deterrence beyond the threat of exclusion
during state proceedings.  See supra, at 8 (quoting
Duckworth, 492 U. S., at 211 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Accord, Friendly, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 163.  And our
decision in Stone expressly so held: -The view that the
deterrence . . . would be furthered rests on the dubious
assumption that law enforcement authorities would fear
that federal habeas review might reveal flaws . . . that
went undetected at trial and on appeal.-  Stone, 428
U. S., at 493 (footnote omitted).  The majority offers no
justification for disregarding our decision in Stone; nor
does it provide any reason to question the truth of Stone's
observation.

                           IV
  As the Court emphasizes today, Miranda's prophylactic
rule is now 26 years old; the police and the state courts
have indeed grown accustomed to it.  Ante, at 13-14.  But
it is precisely because the rule is well accepted that there
is little further benefit to enforcing it on habeas.  We can
depend on law enforcement officials to administer warn-
ings in the first instance and the state courts to provide
a remedy when law enforcement officers err.  None of the
Court's asserted justifications for enforcing Miranda's
prophylactic rule through habeas-neither reverence for
the Fifth Amendment nor the concerns of reliability,
efficiency, and federalism-counsel in favor of the Court's
chosen course.  Indeed, in my view they cut in precisely
the opposite direction.  The Court may reconsider its
decision when presented with empirical data.  See ante,
at 12 (noting absence of empirical data); ante, at 7
(holding only that today's argument in favor of extending
Stone -falls short-).  But I see little reason for such a
costly delay.  Logic and experience are at our disposal
now.  And they amply demonstrate that applying
Miranda's prophylactic rule on habeas does not increase
the amount of justice dispensed; it only increases the
frequency with which the admittedly guilty go free.  In
my view, Miranda imposes such grave costs and produces
so little benefit on habeas that its continued application
is neither tolerable nor justified.  Accordingly, I join Part
III of the Court's opinion but respectfully dissent from the
remainder.